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I investigate the relation between the structure of CEO compensation and 
the investment horizons of a firm’s institutional investors and find results 
consistent with the assertion that short-sighted institutions’ focus on short-
term earnings leads firms to grant more options with higher sensitivity to 
stock price. In contrast, the percentage holdings of long-term investors are 
negatively correlated with the use of options and the sensitivity of total CEO 
equity incentives to changes in stock price. Further results suggest that 
firms with higher short-term institutional ownership are more concerned 
about a negative earnings surprise and that when determining annual 
bonuses, they punish their CEOs more severely. In total, the analyses 
provide evidence that the investment horizon of institutional investors is 
associated with firms’ CEO compensation policies.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the investment 
horizons of a firm’s institutional investors are associated with the 
structure of CEO compensation. Empirical and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some U.S. institutional investors have become active 
in monitoring corporate governance (Del Guercio and Hawkins 
1999; Gillan and Starks 2000, 2003; Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001). 
One important factor that concerns firms’ corporate governance and 
that institutional investors can actively monitor is the process of 
evaluating and rewarding managerial performance (e.g., Hartzell and 
Starks 2003).
In this paper, I argue that the investment horizon of institutional 
investors can influence executive compensation in both direct ways 
and indirect ways. Direct monitoring is likely cost-effective for large 
institutional investors, and institutions are likely to have more 
influence when they have large shares of ownership (Grossman 
and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). At the same time, 
recent theoretical and empirical studies show that a shareholder-
investment horizon affects the extent to which shareholders 
effectively monitor firm managers (Chen, Harford, and Li 2007; 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2005) and how shareholders design 
managerial incentives (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong 2005, 2006; 
Dikolli, Kulp, and Sedatole 2006). Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong 
(2006), for example, provide a theoretical link between a shareholder 
investment horizon and the structure of CEO pay and show that 
optimal compensation contracts for CEOs in a speculative market 
weigh short-term performance more heavily when shareholders have 
shorter investment horizons.
In addition to direct involvement, institutions can affect a firms’ 
executive-compensation policy through investing and trading 
decisions (i.e., clientele effects). Institutions with minor holdings 
may have little incentive to directly monitor, but if the board cares 
about the potential effects of the institutional selling of shares, the 
board may structure executive-compensation policies according 
to institutional investors’ preferences to cater to specific types of 
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institutional investors (Gillan and Starks 2003). 
To investigate the effect of shareholder investment horizons on CEO 
compensation contracts, I test the following hypotheses: (1) greater 
short-term holdings are positively associated with the use of stock 
options and with the sensitivity of new option grants to stock price, 
(2) greater short-term holdings are associated with a more negative 
effect on CEO bonus compensation when a firm misses an earnings 
benchmark, (3) greater long-term holdings are negatively associated 
with the use of stock options and with the sensitivity of CEO equity 
incentives to stock price. 
In line with regulators’ and investors’ concern that myopic 
investment behavior by some institutional investors may lead 
managers to focus on short-term earnings, the results provide 
evidence consistent with short-term investors creating pressures for 
the board of directors to structure executive compensation according 
to these short-term institutions’ preferences (e.g., greater reliance 
on stock options that do not need to be expensed and larger annual 
bonus penalties for missing quarterly earnings benchmarks). 
The results also indicate that short-term institutional ownership 
is positively related to new option-grants sensitivity to stock price, 
consistent with Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006)’s theoretical 
prediction that firms with more short-horizon shareholders design 
compensation contracts to provide strong incentives for managers 
to boost a short-term speculative component in stock price. I also 
find that the greater long-term holdings are negatively associated 
with the use of stock options and with the sensitivity of CEO 
equity portfolio incentives to stock price, supporting the view that 
institutional monitoring induced by long-term-investment horizons 
substitutes for managerial incentives. 
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, 
this study advances our understanding of the relation between 
short-term shareholders and board of directors’ governance-related 
decisions.1) My findings are consistent with short-term shareholders 
1) Dikolli et al. (2006) also examine the relation between types of institutional in-
vestors and CEO compensation contracts. Focusing on the cash portion of CEO 
compensation, they test whether a board uses CEO compensation contracts that 
mitigate or cater to short-term investment horizons of transient institutions. My 
study complements Dikolli et al. (2006) by considering two important CEO com-
pensation decisions that boards make: (1) CEO equity incentives and (2) subjec-
tive/individual evaluations of CEOs, proxied by penalties for missing earnings 
benchmarks.
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emphasizing short-term stock performance in the design of CEO 
compensation, supporting that myopic investment behavior will 
likely place undue pressures for short-term performance on the 
firms’ boards of directors as they make governance decisions (Bushee 
2004; Parrino, Sias, and Starks 2003). 
Second, this study adds to the growing literature on the role that 
accounting plays in firms’ design of CEO compensation contracts 
(Carter, Lynch, and Tuna 2007; Ferri, Sandino, and Markarian 
2006; Hu 2006; Kimbrough and Louis 2004) by demonstrating 
that favorable accounting treatments of options drive short-term 
investors’ preferences for the use of stock options. 
Finally, prior research documents that institutional ownership 
concentration is positively related to pay-for-performance sensitivity 
from new option grants (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks 2005; 
Hartzell and Starks 2003). I extend these studies by showing that 
the percentage ownership by short-term and long-term shareholders 
is also an important predictor of CEO incentives. 
Recently, the U.S House of Representatives passed the “The 
Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act” that mandates 
a nonbinding vote on executive compensation for every public 
company. My results suggest that to the extent that short-sighted 
shareholders have a say on CEO pay, CEOs will increase their 
attention to short-term profits to justify pay rather than investing in 
long-run business strategies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I review prior 
literature and develop my hypotheses in Section 2. In Section 3 and 
4, I discuss my research design and   present the results. Section 5 
concludes. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Firms’ ownership structure and its effect on corporate policies 
have received much attention from academic researchers (Cho 2009; 
Choi, Kwak, and Yoo 2007, 2008) Institutional investors are known 
to monitor their portfolio firms’ governance practices by establishing 
proxy-voting policies, by voting proxies to counter firm-management 
positions, by filing shareholder proposals, and by initiating frequent 
contact with portfolio firm management (Gillan and Starks 2000). 
Recent evidence suggests that executive compensation is one of the 
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key governance issues of concern to institutional investors (Davis 
and Kim 2007; Hartzell and Starks 2003; Rothberg and Lilien 2005; 
Hu 2006).
Although direct monitoring could be cost-effective for large 
institutional investors (Grossman and Hart 1980), the extent to 
which shareholders can monitor firms’ management may also 
reflect other factors such as shareholders’ investment horizons and 
liquidity concerns. Shareholders with longer horizons have more 
incentive to invest their resources in monitoring even if their stake 
is not large because they are likely to retain the investment and to 
reap the corresponding benefits from monitoring (Chen, Harford, 
and Li 2007; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2005).
While long-term shareholders will have lower monitoring costs, 
direct monitoring such as filing shareholder proposals can be 
prohibitively costly and time-consuming activities for short-term 
shareholders (Brandes, Hadani, and Goranova 2006). This is 
especially true insofar as shareholders typically face a series of legal 
and structural hurdles in influencing a board’s governance-related 
decisions. 
However, even shareholders with short horizon can “vote with 
their feet” when they are dissatisfied with a firm’s governance 
practices such as executive compensation.2) Chan and Lakonishok 
(1995) report evidence that the trading by high turnover institutions 
produces the largest stock price impacts. Bushee (1998, 2004) and 
Bushee and Noe (2000) have shown that short-term investors focus 
and trade on short-term earnings news, thereby creating high stock 
return volatility. Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) document that 
stock price response to negative earnings news is more pronounced 
for firms with higher momentum institutional ownership. 
Collectively, prior research findings document that investor 
composition influences the sensitivity of stock price to short-term 
performance, suggesting that clientele effect, through fear of certain 
institutional selling, could cause the board to make compensation 
decisions consistent with institutional preferences. To the extent 
that undervaluation caused by short-term institutional selling is 
costly to firms, the board may cater to short-term institutions by 
2) Consistent with this argument, Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that firms 
that fired their CEO had a significantly greater decline in institutional ownership 
in the year prior to CEO turnover, and this finding supports the assertion that 
institutional selling influences a board’s decisions. 
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strategically structuring executive compensation practices according 
to short-term institutional investors’ preferences. 
Short-Term Investors and Executive Compensation
Short-Term Investors and Stock Options. 
Firms with more shares held by short-term institutions are likely 
to grant more options to CEOs relative to other components of 
CEO pay. Until recently, the use of stock options did not require 
recording of an income-statement expense and few firms chose 
to voluntarily expense stock options.3)  Prior research documents 
that the accounting treatment of options motivated firms to use 
stock options (Carter, Lynch, and Tuna 2007; Core and Guay 1999; 
Kimbrough and Louis 2004; Matsunaga 1995). 
In line with the effect that favorable accounting treatment of 
stock options (compared to that of restricted stocks and cash 
compensation) has on CEO pay mix, prior research demonstrates 
(1) that firms with higher capital market pressure are more likely 
to use stock options as executive-oriented rewards (Carter, Lynch, 
and Tuna 2007) and (2) that firms grant more options when doing 
so helps the firms meet certain earnings benchmarks (Kimbrough 
and Louis 2004).4) These findings suggest that firms facing capital 
market pressure will prefer using stock options to avoid recognizing 
compensation expenses5) and this strategy will help the firms achieve 
3) Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (2004) identified 155 firms that voluntarily recog-
nized stock-based compensation as an expense in 2002. However, this is not the 
case for S&P 1500 firms covered by the ExecuComp database. For example, Cart-
er, Lynch, and Tuna (2007) identify only one or two ExecuComp firms that, each 
year between 1998 and 2001, expensed stock options. Even for 2002, the final 
year of my sample period, I find that only thirty-two ExecuComp firms expensed 
options, and this finding suggests that a majority of my sample firms did not ex-
pense stock options during my sample period (1998-2002). 
4) McConnell, Pegg, Mott, and Senyek (2005, 8) report that if the FASB required 
firms to expense employee stock options on income statements, the 2002 S&P 
500 reported net income from continuing operations would have declined by 17% 
(Also see Botosan and Plumlee, 2001).
5) Although stock option expenses are disclosed in footnotes for non-expensing 
firms, prior research suggests that investors may place more weight on recog-
nized amounts than on disclosed amounts (Espahbodi, Espahbodi, Rezaee, and 
Tehranian, 2002). Carter, Lynch, and Tuna (2007) find that firms both increase 
the use of restricted stocks and reduce options and that the firms make these 
decisions in line with the firms’ decision to begin to expense options. This finding 
suggests that stock option accounting has played a key role in determining CEO 
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a string of earnings increases and meet analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
in turn, enjoy higher price-earnings multiples (Barth, Elliott, and 
Finn 1999; Carter and Lynch 2003). Thus, I expect that firms with 
more short-term institutional ownership are more sensitive to the 
expected costs of recording compensation expenses and thereby use 
more stock options. 
Short-Term Investors and the Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity of 
Option Grants. 
Firms with more shares held by short-term institutions are 
likely to grant stock options with higher sensitivity to stock price. 
Prior research documents that the CEOs with higher stock-based 
incentives may have incentive to manipulate earnings (Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 
2005; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007). Burns and Kedia 
(2006) find that stock options with higher sensitivity to stock price 
provide the CEO with stronger incentives to misreport compared to 
other components of CEO pay such as stocks. Bolton, Scheinkman, 
and Xiong (2006) analytically show that optimal managerial 
compensation contracts may weight short-term price performance at 
the expense of long-term value in a speculative market characterized 
by investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
Since the sensitivity of option grants to stock price provides the 
CEO with strong incentives to boost short-term earnings due to 
their convex payoffs (Burns and Kedia 2006), the firms with more 
short-term ownership could provide the CEO with stronger short-
term incentives by granting new options that are more sensitive to 
a change in stock price. Thus, I predict a positive relation between 
short-term institutional ownership and the sensitivity of new option 
grants to a firm’s stock price. 
Short-Term Investors and Bonus Penalty of Missing an Earnings 
Benchmark. 
Shareholder investment horizons can influence other components 
of CEO pay such as annual bonus, which is often linked to 
accounting earnings. Managers cater to the investors’ demand for 
positive earnings surprises (Rajgopal, Shivakumar, and Simpson 
2007). Recent evidence suggests that managers are paying much 
pay mix.
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attention to efforts to meet forecasted earnings benchmarks and 
that there are substantial penalties for firms that miss analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; 
Skinner and Sloan 2002). In line with these findings, Matsunaga 
and Park (2001) document a significant incremental adverse effect 
on CEO annual cash bonuses when a firm’s quarterly earnings fall 
short of either the consensus analyst forecast or the earnings for the 
same quarter of the prior year, after a general pay-for-performance 
relationship is controlled. 
I predict that the boards of firms with higher short-term 
institutional ownership are likely to perceive greater costs when the 
firms miss analysts’ forecasts. Prior research documents that a high 
level of short-term ownership is associated with the likelihood that 
firms will reduce R&D in order to reverse an earnings decline (Bushee 
998), with market pricing of near-term earnings (Bushee 2001), with 
the likelihood that firms will meet or exceed earnings benchmarks 
(Matsumoto 2002), with the likelihood that firms will use  earnings 
restatements and discretionary accruals (Burns, Kedia, and 
Lipson 2006), and with market reaction to negative earnings news 
(Hotchkiss and Strickland 2003). 
Overall, these findings suggest that boards of firms with higher 
short-term institutional ownership are likely more concerned about 
a negative earnings surprise and that they may punish the CEO 
more severely by exercising discretion over CEO compensation. 
Long-Term Investors and Executive Compensation
Unlike short-term institutions, long-term institutions are 
ambiguous in relation to whether or not they prefer stock options. 
On the one hand, long-term institutions may prefer options because 
stock options provide CEOs with the incentive to increase firm 
value (Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin 2003) and to take more risks 
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006). On the other hand, granting stock 
options could lead to the dilution of shareholder values (Brandes, 
Hadani, and Goranova 2006; Ferri, Sandino, and Markarian 2006). 
As discussed earlier, CEOs with stock option compensation may 
have the greater incentives to manipulate earnings. Prior research 
also documents that CEOs with stock options strategically time 
the release of good and bad news (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; 
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Yermack 1997), backdate stock options (Heron and Lie 2007; 
Lie 2005) and pursue investment projects that increase short-
term stock price performance at the expense of long-term value. 
Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2007) find that the positive impact 
of option compensation on firm performance largely disappears 
when measured performance is adjusted for the effect of earnings 
management. 
Since long-term institutions’ preferences for executive 
compensation are unclear, it is unlikely that the board may 
cater to long-term institutions by strategically structuring CEO 
compensation. Long-term shareholders, however, will have more 
incentives to monitor their portfolio firms’ executive compensation 
because the net benefits of monitoring increases with investment 
horizons (Chen, Harford, and Li 2007; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 
2005).
In line with standard agency theory suggesting that incentives 
and shareholder monitoring could substitute for each other (Engel, 
Gordon, and Hayes 2002; Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine 1999; 
Mehran 1995), I predict that long-term institutional ownership 
will be negatively related to the use of stock options and the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of CEO options and stocks portfolio 
incentives. To the extent that monitoring by long-term institutional 
shareholders is possible, there will be less demand for compensation 
contracts that impose greater risk through greater weights on 
equity-based incentives to CEOs. 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Sample Selection
My sample starts from the intersection of ExecuComp, CDA/
Spectrum, CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and the I/B/E/S during the 1992-
2002 periods. I obtain CEO compensation data from ExecuComp, 
which covers companies from the S&P 500, S&P 400 mid-cap, and 
S&P 600 small-cap indices starting from 1992. I draw stock returns 
and accounting variables from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively. 
I use the I/B/E/S database to obtain quarterly earnings forecasts. 
I obtain quarterly institutional ownership data from the CDA/
Spectrum database of 13F filings. All investors with at least $100 
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million in equity holdings are required to file 13F forms with the 
SEC. I base the institutional-investment-horizon classification on 
Bushee (1998, 2001). For all subsequent analyses, I use institutional 
ownership data from the quarter that is closest to firms’ fiscal-year 
end. I draw key governance variables from the IRRC database. 
In order to reduce the effects of extreme observations, I winsorize 
the top and bottom 1 percent of the distributions of all continuous 
variables. My final sample consists of 9,433 firm-year observations 
from 1,848 distinct firms (referred to as the “full sample”). Since I 
include a set of governance variables as controls and those were 
available from the IRRC database only for the 1998-2002 period, I 
test some of my hypotheses using a “reduced sample” (4,031 firm-
years from 1,154 distinct firms). 
Compensation Variables
To fully capture the structure of CEO compensation, I employ four 
dependent variables. First, I use the ratio of the Black-Scholes value 
of stock options to CEO total compensation (%Equity_grant) in order 
to examine the effect of institutional investor horizons on decisions 
regarding annual CEO pay mix. 
Second, Hartzell and Starks (2003) test the association between 
institutional ownership concentration and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of new option-grants using the dollar change in the value 
of the annual option grants for a $1,000 change in shareholder 
wealth (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995). In order to make 
my results directly comparable to those of Hartzell and Starks (2003), 
I measure new option- grants sensitivity to price (Option_PPS) with 
the dollar change in the value of the annual option grant to the CEO 
for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. 
Third, I measure CEO equity incentives with the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of CEO options and stocks portfolio 
including previously granted options and stocks (Core and Guay 
1999). Following Core and Guay (1999), I use a percentage-change 
measure of CEO equity incentives (Equity_incen1) as my dependent 
variable that shall capture the dollar changes (in thousands) in 
CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price.  An alternative measure 
could be the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in firm 
value (Jensen and Murphy 1990). In order to ensure that my results 
are robust to the alternative measure of incentives, I also use the 
Institutional Investment Horizons and CEO Compensation 103
Jensen and Murphy (1990) fractional measure of incentives (Equity_
incen2). 
Finally, consistent with Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang (1996) 
and Matsunaga and Park (2001), I use change in CEO annual bonus 
deflated by prior-year salary (∆Bonus) to test the influence of short-
term institutional investors through their pressures on the board’s 
annual CEO bonus decisions.
Institutional Investment Horizons Variables
Bushee (1998, 2001) proposes classification of institutional inves-
tors on the basis of investment-horizon length: transient, quasi-in-
dexers, and dedicated.6) In his classification, “transient” institutions 
are characterized as having both high portfolio turnover and highly 
diversified portfolio holdings, as well as the highest use of momen-
tum strategies. As such, the short investment horizons of these 
institutions create little incentive to actively monitor and influence 
firms’ executive compensation practices, and I measure short-term 
institutions’ ownership using transient institutions’ ownership. 
The other two types of institutions, “dedicated” and “quasi-index-
ers,” reflect long-term, stable ownership by institutions. Dedicated 
institutions are characterized by high concentration, low turnover, 
and almost no trading sensitivity to current earnings. Quasi-index-
ers are also characterized by low turnover, but they tend to have 
diversified holdings and to use a buy-and-hold strategy for portfolio-
fund investments. I measure long-term institutions’ ownership on 
the basis of the sum of quasi-indexers’ and dedicated institutions’ 
ownership.7)
6) Bushee (1998) created three constructs from nine key variables characterizing 
the past investment behavior of institutional investors using factor analysis. The 
BLOCK factor captures the average size of an institution’s stake in its portfolio 
firms. The PTURN factor captures the extent to which an institution trades more 
frequently. The MOMEN factor captures the trading sensitivity to current earn-
ings news. Then, scores from these factors are used to create three distinct clas-
sifications using cluster analysis.  
7) Quasi-indexers are classified into Long because they are more likely to be en-
gaged in monitoring. Their holdings are often so large that the shares cannot 
be sold without driving the price down and suffering further losses (Gillan and 
Starks, 2000). Furthermore, the fact that pension funds index a large portion 
of their portfolios precludes them from selling underperforming stocks. Bushee 
(2004) uses CALPERS as an example of quasi-indexers and CALPERS is indeed 
the one which has been the most visible in shareholder activism.
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Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Correlations
Panel A of table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in my analyses. I report institutional ownership variables on 
the basis of the “full sample” in table 1.
The mean institutional ownership in the sample firms is 59.2%. 
This percentage is much higher than reported in previous studies 
(e.g., 35.8% in Bushee, 2001) that used a COMPUSTAT sample in 
the years preceding this study’s sample period. This figure suggests 
that ExecuComp firms, on average, are large and surviving firms 
with higher institutional ownership. The mean percentage holdings 
by short-term institutions (Short) and long-term institutions 
(Long) are 17.9% and 40.3%, respectively. The mean proportion of 
institutional ownership accounted for by the five largest institutions 
(Concen_Top5) is 42.2%, comparable to 44.0% reported by Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) and based on a 1992-1997 time period. 
The mean and the median percentages of CEO compensation that 
are in the form of stock options are 40.2% and 40.6%, respectively, 
and these figures suggest that the sample firms heavily rely on stock 
options as a vehicle by which the firms annually reward their CEOs. 
The mean and the median dollar values of CEO new option grants 
sensitivity is $2.39 and $1.2 per $1,000, respectively. The mean 
and the median dollar values of CEO equity portfolio incentives 
(Equity_incen1) are $1,036,600 and $265,500, respectively. These 
figures suggest that an average sample CEO is subject to huge 
potential gains and losses in response to a change in stock price. On 
average, CEOs of the sample firms own about 2.3% of total shares 
outstanding. The board, on average, consists of nine directors and 
meets seven times per year. The average fraction of compensation 
committee members independent of firm’s management is 90.6%.
Panel B of table 1 provides the frequency distribution of missed-
benchmark variables. Although a majority of firms meet the 
benchmark for all four quarters or miss it just once, 34.8% (analyst 
forecasts) and 35.5% (same quarter of prior-year earnings) of firm-
years miss their quarterly earnings benchmark more than once in a 
year. 
Table 2 provides Pearson correlations among the institutional 
ownership variables and the key dependent variables. Not 
surprisingly, the percentage holdings by short-term institutions are 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Variables used in Empirical Analyses
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Tih 9433 0.592 0.182 0.467 0.606 0.729
Short 9433 0.179 0.132 0.076 0.147 0.256
ΔShort 7585 0.023 0.096 -0.027 0.014 0.067
Long 9433 0.403 0.141 0.302 0.400 0.500
ΔLong 7585 -0.007 0.095 -0.058 -0.001 0.049
Concen_Top5 9433 0.422 0.131 0.330 0.403 0.490
ΔBonus 9433 0.083 0.810 -0.168 0.033 0.356
ΔEarn 9433 0.002 0.076 -0.013 0.007 0.021
Ret 9433 0.136 0.493 -0.160 0.072 0.344
%Equity_grant 4031 0.402 0.295 0.133 0.406 0.644
Equity_incen1 4031 5.617 1.594 4.575 5.582 6.655
Equity_incen2 4031 2.724 1.364 1.900 2.771 3.539
Option_PPS 4031 2.392 3.935 0.250 1.234 3.041
Expense 4031 0.006 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000
Incen_residual 4031 0.011 0.198 -0.097 0.003 0.108
Noise_roa 4031 0.041 0.048 0.013 0.025 0.050
Noise_ret 4031 0.484 0.408 0.241 0.359 0.559
High_tax 4031 0.340 0.474 0.000 0.000 1.000
Low_tax 4031 0.085 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lev 4031 0.248 0.175 0.097 0.251 0.369
Btm 4031 0.524 0.380 0.255 0.448 0.685
Ownership 4031 0.023 0.053 0.001 0.003 0.014
Size 4031 7.495 1.624 6.317 7.333 8.582
New 4031 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fcf 4031 0.002 0.172 -0.039 0.017 0.067
Bd_size 4031 9.476 2.534 8.000 9.000 11.000
Num_mtg 4031 7.001 2.650 5.000 6.000 8.000
Dual 4031 0.716 0.451 0.000 1.000 1.000
Comp_ind 4031 0.906 0.180 0.833 1.000 1.000
Tenure 4031 7.042 6.994 2.000 5.000 10.000
Dir_own 4031 0.090 0.136 0.004 0.033 0.119
SP500 4031 0.388 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000
Beta 4031 0.944 0.610 0.522 0.844 1.240
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Idiosyn 4031 0.028 0.012 0.019 0.026 0.034
Loss 4031 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000
M_ret 4031 0.106 0.591 -0.261 0.023 0.330
Dp 4022 0.013 0.019 0.000 0.006 0.020
Ep 4031 0.017 0.219 0.019 0.045 0.069
Liq 4031 0.144 0.141 0.064 0.100 0.168
Sprating 4031 4.833 2.559 4.000 5.000 6.000
Sgr 4029 0.099 0.318 -0.025 0.062 0.171
Cfo 4031 0.117 0.150 0.050 0.096 0.157
Shrs 4031 4.283 1.286 3.309 4.052 5.082
Variable definitions:
Tih =percentage of total institutional holdings;
Short =percentage of institutional holdings by transient investors;
Long =  percentage of the sum of institutional holdings by quasi-indexers and 
institutional holdings by dedicated institutional investors;
ΔBonus = change in CEO’s bonus deflated by prior year salary;
ΔEarn =  change in annual core earnings deflated by market value of equity at 
the beginning of the period; 
Ret = monthly compounded annual stock return;
Concen_Top5 =  fraction of all institutional ownership held by the top 5 largest 
institutions (= Top5 holdings / Tih); 
%Equity_grant =  the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of stock options to CEO 
total compensation at year t; 
Equity_incen1 =  natural log of the dollar change (in thousands) in the value of 
a CEO’s total equity portfolio incentives for a 1% change in a 
firm’s stock price as defined in Core and Guay (1999);
Equity_incen2 =  natural log of the dollar change in the value of a CEO’s total 
equity portfolio incentives for a $1,000 change in shareholder 
wealth defined in Jensen and Murphy (1990);
Option_PPS =  the dollar change in the value of the annual option grant to the 
CEO for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth;
Expense = 1 if the firm voluntarily expense options, and 0 otherwise; 
Incen_residual =  natural log of (actual CEO equity incentive level/predicted 
CEO equity incentive level) for year t-1, where predicted equity 
incentive level is estimated from a prediction model by Core 
and Guay (1999); 
Noise_roa =  time-series standard deviation of the firm’s return on asset ratio 
over the prior 5 years at year t; 
Noise_ret =  time-series standard deviation of the firm’s annual stock return 
over the prior 5 years at year t;
Table 1. (Continued)
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High_tax =  1 if the firm has a positive pretax book income and no net operating 
loss carry-forwards, and 0 otherwise;
Low_tax =  1 if the firm has a negative pretax book income and net operating 
loss carry-forwards, and 0 otherwise;
Lev = book value of liabilities divided by its book value of assets at year t; 
Btm =  book to market ratio defined as its book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity;
Ownership = percentage of common shares owned by its CEO at year t;
Size =  the natural log of market value of equity defined as the firm’s price per 
share at year t’s fiscal year end (Compustat data item 199) multiplied by 
the number of shares outstanding (Compustat data item 25);
New =  1 if the firm is a new-economy firm (new-economy firms are firms with 
SIC codes   3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 
5045, 5961, 7370, 7371,7372, 7373), and 0 otherwise; 
Fcf =  sum of the firm’s net operating cash flow (Compustat data item 308) 
and net investing cash flow (Compustat data item 311) scaled by market 
value of equity; 
Bd_size = the number of board of directors at year t; 
Num_mtg = the number of the board meetings during year t;
Dual = 1 if the CEO is the chairman of the Board and 0 otherwise;
Comp_ind = percentage of independent directors on compensation committee;
Tenure = number of years the firm’s CEO has held office at year t;
Dirown =  (1000* the sum of number of stock options and number of shares 
granted to independent directors) divided by number of shares 
outstanding at year t;
Negfe (J) =  1 if earnings were below the consensus analyst forecast for exactly 
J quarters during the year and 0 otherwise;
Decrease (J) =  1 if earnings were below earnings for the same quarter for the 
previous year for exactly J quarters and 0 otherwise;
Beta =  the market model beta, estimated over a maximum 60 and minimum of 
12 months;
Idiosyn =  unsystematic risk, defined as the standard deviation of daily market 
model residuals over the prior year;
Loss = 1 if the firm reports net loss, and 0 otherwise;
M_ret = the market adjusted return;
Dp = dividend-to-price ratio;
Ep = earnings-price-ratio;
Liq =  average monthly trading volume divided by shares outstanding over the 
year;
SPrating = S&P common stock rating;
Sgr = sales growth relative to previous year;
Cfo = cash flow form operations;  
Shrs = natural log of shares outstanding;
Table 1. (Continued)
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negatively correlated with those by long-term institutions. 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS
Influence of Institutional Investment Horizons on the Use of Stock Options in 
Annual CEO Compensation
In this section, I test whether the composition of institutional 
ownership is associated with annual CEO compensation decisions. 
%Equity_grant i,t =  β + β1Shorti,t + β2Expensei,t + β3Short*Expensei,t  
+ β4Concen_Top5i,t + β5Incen_residuali,t-1  
+ β6ln(Idiosyn)i,t + β7Noise_roai,t + β8Noise_reti,t  
+ β9High_taxi,t + β10Low_taxi,t + β11Levi,t + β12Btmi,t  
+ β13Ownershipi,t + β14Sizei,t + β15Newi,t + β16Fcfi,t  
+ β17ln(Bd_size)i,t + β18ln(Num_mtg)i,t + β19Duali,t  
















 + ε i,t     (1)
%Equity_grant i,t =  β + β1Longi,t + β2Expensei,t + β3Concen_Top5i,t  
+ β4Incen_residuali,t-1 + β5Noise_roai,t + β6Noise_reti,t 
+ β7High_taxi,t + β8Low_taxi,t + β9Levi,t + β10Btmi,t  
+ β11Ownershipi,t + β12Sizei,t + β13Newi,t + β14Fcfi,t  
Panel B: Frequency Distribution of Missed Benchmark Dummy Variables (N 
= 9,433)
# of Quarters Missed
# of Observations (%) Earnings Benchmark
Analyst Forecast Prior Year Earnings
0 3,408 (36.1%) 4,321 (45.8%)
1 2,739 (29.0%) 1,767 (18.7%)
2 1,861 (19.7%) 1,405 (14.9%)
3 1,049 (11.1%) 1,063 (11.3%)
4 376 (4.0%) 877 (9.3%)
Actual earnings per share and the latest consensus earnings forecast are 
obtained from the I/B/E/S.
Table 1. (Continued)
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+ β15ln(Bd_size)i,t + β16ln(Num_mtg)i,t + β17Duali,t  
















 + ε i,t    (2)
                            (t = 1998-2002)
See table 1 for variable measurement. I predict that percentage 
holdings by short-term (long-term) institutions are positively 
(negatively) associated with the percentage of CEO compensation 
in the form of stock options (%Equity_grant). To compare OLS 
results with 2SLS results that will be discussed later, I estimate two 
separate regressions that use short-term institutions’ percentage 
holdings (Short) and long-term institutions’ percentage holdings 
(Long) as explanatory variables, respectively. In all OLS-regression 
specifications in this paper, I use Huber-White robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. These standard errors are robust to both 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Rogers 1993). 
To examine the role of stock option accounting as a driver of 
short-term institutions’ preference for firms’ use of stock options, 
I create an indicator variable, Expense, which takes on either the 
value of 1 if the firm voluntarily expenses options or the value 0 
otherwise.8) I include Expense for both of the regressions and add 
an interaction term between Expense and Short in equation 1. In 
equation 1, I additionally control for firms’ idiosyncratic risk (Idiosyn) 
to rule out the possibility that higher-stock-return volatility caused 
by short-term institutions drives the association between %Equity_
grant and Short (e.g., Bushee and Noe 2000).9)   
8) I obtained from McConnell, Pegg, Mott, and Senyek (2004) a list comprising 842 
companies that had adopted option expensing under SFAS 123. From that list, 
I identified the ExecuComp firms that had chosen to expense options during my 
sample period. 
9) Without controlling for stock return volatility, the association between short-term 
institutional ownership and firms’ use of options may simply capture a second-
order effect of stock return volatility on the use of stock options, as suggested 
by Bushee and Noe (2000). A challenge here is that stock return volatility is one 
of key direct inputs in calculating the Black-Scholes value of option, suggesting 
that including stock return volatility as a control is likely to introduce a mechani-
cal relation between stock return volatility and the dependent variable, %Equity_
grant. To tackle this problem, I control for firms’ idiosyncratic risk (Idiosyn) be-
cause Bushee and Noe (2000, 199) show that their results are unchanged when 
stock return volatility is replaced with unsystematic risk.
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For both of the regressions, I include the fraction of institutional 
ownership accounted for by the five largest institutions (Concen_
Top5) to control for institutional ownership concentration 
(Hartzell and Starks 2003). I build on prior research and include a 
comprehensive set of economic determinants of firms’ use of stock-
based compensation as control variables. 
Core and Guay (1999) suggest that new options grants are related 
to the degree to which the CEO’s equity portfolio deviates from 
optimal incentives. Thus, I include the deviation of CEO equity 
portfolio from optimal level in prior year (Incen_residualt-1), following 
Core and Guay (1999). I also include firm size, tenure, growth 
opportunities, tax-related incentives, prior CEO ownership, new 
economy indicator variable, and cash constraints (Bryan, Hwang, 
and Lilien 2000; Carter, Lynch, and Tuna 2007; Core and Guay 
1999; Ittner, Larcker, and Lambert 2003; Murphy 2003; Smith and 
Watts 1992; Yermack 1995). 
Prior research also documents that firms’ governance plays a role 
in determining executive pay mix (Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin 
2003; Mehran 1995) and it is indeed possible that institutions 
may influence CEO compensation indirectly through improved 
governance. Thus, I use detailed governance variables drawn from 
the IRRC database during the 1998-2002 period to control for the 
effect of firms’ governance on the use of stock options. I include 
board size (Bd_size), the number of board meetings (Num_mtg), the 
fraction of independent directors on compensation committee (Comp_
ind), and CEO duality (Dual) (i.e., the CEO also serves as chairman 
of the board of directors).
Table 3 reports the estimation results for equations 1 and 2. 
Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimation results and columns 3 
and 4 report two-stage least square (2SLS) results discussed in the 
appendix.10) Consistent with prior research, the percentage of stock 
options in CEO annual compensation is positively correlated with 
10) The TOBIT model is also widely used in the literature (e.g., Yermack, 1995; Hart-
zell and Starks, 2003) when a dependent variable is one that is roughly continu-
ous over strictly positive values but zero for a non-trivial fraction of the popula-
tion. Because not every firm grants stock options to its CEO every year, 20.1% 
of %Equity_grant in my sample takes on the value of zero. Thus, I estimate the 
equations 1 and 2 by using the TOBIT model, and the results remain unchanged. 
I also estimate a firm fixed-effects model to control for the effect of unobserved 
firm heterogeneity (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999). The results are simi-
lar to those reported in columns 1 and 2 in table 3. 
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firm size, volatility, and the new economy indicator variable, but 
negatively correlated with the deviation of CEO equity portfolio from 
optimal level in prior year, the high-tax indicator variable, prior 
stock ownership, free cash flow, and CEO tenure.
OLS estimation results (columns 1 and 2) indicate that the 
percentage holdings by short-term institutions (Short) are 
significantly positively related to the percentage of CEO option 
compensation, even after a comprehensive set of economic and 
governance determinants of the use of stock-options is controlled 
for (t-statistic = 3.19, two-tailed), supporting my prediction. This 
finding is consistent with short-term institutions’ focus on short-
term earnings—a focus that encourages firms to use stock options 
that need not be expensed. This use, in turn, creates an increase in 
options for annual CEO pay mix decisions (Carter, Lynch, and Tuna 
2007; Kimbrough and Louis 2004). 
However, this positive relation between Short and %Equity_
grant does not hold for firms that voluntarily expense options, as 
evidenced by the non-significance of coefficients (β1 + β3). In firms 
that choose to voluntarily expense stock options, the board does not 
appear to cater to short-term institutions’ incentives in structuring 
CEO pay. 
Contrary to my prediction, the percentage holdings by long-term 
(Long) are significantly positively correlated with the percentage of 
stock-option compensation (t-statistic = 2.06, two-tailed). These 
findings, however, should be interpreted with caution owing to a 
potentially endogenous relation between institutional ownership and 
CEO pay mix.11)
To address potential endogeneity issues, columns 3 and 4 present 
two-stage least square results from an estimation of simultaneous 
equations that explicitly consider the possibility that institutional 
ownership and CEO pay mix are jointly determined (see appendix).12) 
11) It is possible that firms adopt specific compensation policies to attract certain 
types of institutional investors in response to institutional investors’ stock prefer-
ences. For example, short-term (long-term) institutional investors are more (less) 
likely to have a preference for stocks from firms that heavily rely on stock options 
(e.g., high %Equity_grant).   
12) Venkatachalam (2000) points out the potential endogeneity issue between insti-
tutional holdings and a researcher’s variables of interest, and recommends a si-
multaneous estimation technique. It is well known in the econometrics literature 
that low explanatory power in first-stage estimation causes second-stage coeffi-
cient estimates to have large sampling variance. However, the explanatory power 
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Overall, the results confirm the previous OLS regression results with 
respect to short-term institutions (Short): the percentage holdings by 
short-term institutions are positively associated with the percentage 
of option compensation after potential simultaneity bias is controlled 
for. 
However, in contrast to the results in column 2, the percentage 
holdings by long-term institutions are negatively associated with the 
percentage of stock option compensation (t-statistic = -3.54, two-
tailed). This finding suggests that the previous result in column 2 
with respect to the positive relation between Long and %Equity_
grant is driven by potential simultaneity bias. 
Finally, to further test the robustness of these findings, I take first 
differences in equations 2 and 3 and run OLS regressions. Columns 
(5) and (6) present OLS estimation results of first-differenced 
models. Again, the results confirm the previous levels regression 
results: change in the percentage holdings by short-term (long-term) 
institutions is positively (negatively) associated with the percentage 
of CEO stock option compensation. Collectively, the results in 
table 3 provide evidence consistent with the idea that the boards 
of firms consider shareholders’ preferences regarding annual CEO 
compensation decisions and cater to certain types of institutional 
investors by structuring annual CEO pay mix decisions according to 
shareholders’ preferences.
Influence of Institutional Investment Horizons on Pay-for-Performance 
Sensitivity of CEO New Option Grants
To test my prediction, I estimate the following TOBIT regression 
equation, following Hartzell and Starks (2003).
Option_PPS i,t =  β + β1Concen_Top5i,t + β2Inst_Hori,t + β3Mkt_Capi,t  
















 + ε i,t  (3)
                       (t = 1999-2002)
Where: Inst_Hor represents Short and Long.
of the first-stage regressions ranges from 21.9% to 44.4%, a range that mitigates 
potential inference problems. 
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See table 1 for variable measurement. Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
find that both institutional ownership concentration (Concen_Top5) 
and total institutional holdings (Tih) are positively related to new 
option-grants sensitivity for top-five highly paid executives. I first 
replicate their findings in order to see if their results hold for my 
CEOs-only sample and then divide total institutional ownership 
according to investment horizons to examine the effect of investment 
horizons on the sensitivity of new option-grants.
Table 4 reports the TOBIT estimation results for equation 3. 
Column 1 reports the replication results of Hartzell and Starks 
(2003). Overall, the results are consistent with those reported 
in Hartzell and Starks (2003). Both institutional ownership 
concentration (Concen_Top5) and total institutional ownership (Tih) 
are positively associated with the sensitivity of option grants to stock 
price. 
Column 2 reports the results when Tih is replaced with Short and 
Long. Consistent with my hypothesis, Short is positively related to 
the sensitivity of option-grants to stock price (p < 0.01, two-tailed) 
but Long is negatively related to option-grant sensitivity (p < 0.01, 
two-tailed). This result is consistent with Bolton, Scheinkman, and 
Xiong (2006)’s prediction that short-term institutions influence the 
board so that CEO compensation contract puts more weights on 
short-term performance through granting options that are more 
sensitive to stock price. A negative coefficient on Long may reflect 
long-term oriented shareholders’ incentives to monitor or their fear 
of the consequences of potential earnings manipulations induced by 
the sensitivity of options to stock price. 
In a recent study, Smith and Swan (2007) argue that the positive 
relationship between institutional concentration and option-grants 
pay-for-performance sensitivity documented by Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) is sensitive to the measurement of firm size proxy. Smith 
and Swan (2007) conjecture and show that Hartzell and Starks’s 
measure of institutional concentration is strongly negatively 
correlated with the natural logarithm of market capitalization.13) 
To address this concern, I re-estimate the Hartzell and Starks 
regression using the natural logarithm of market capitalization as 
13) Consistent with their conjecture, the correlation between Concen_Top5 and Size 
in my sample is -0.55.
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Table 4. Influence of Institutional Investment Horizons on the  Pay-for-
Performance Sensitivity of New Option Grants
Option_PPS i,t =  β + β1Concen_Top5i,t + β2Inst_Hori,t + β3Mkt_Capi,t + β4Tobin’sQi,t  
 














 + ε i,t

















Constant 0.256 0.558 6.284 *** 5.406 ***
(0.67) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)
Concen_Top5 + 2.078 *** 3.463 *** -1.386 * 0.109
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.90)
Tih + 1.411 *** 2.190 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Short + 5.385 *** 4.432 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Long − -2.267 *** -0.325
(0.00) (0.66)
Mkt_Cap -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Tobin’s Q -0.080 -0.095 * 0.037 0.006
(0.13) (0.07) (0.49) (0.91)




0.0001 ** 0.0001 * 0.0001 0.0001
(0.02) (0.06) (0.38) (0.37)










*, **, and ***: Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
For parsimony, the coefficients on year-dummies and industry dummies are 
not reported. 
Mkt_Cap = market value of the firm (millions). Tobin’s Q = market value of 
the firm’s assets scaled by the book value of the firm at year t. ∆Shareholder_
Wealth = Change in the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the fiscal 
year end price from year t-1 to t. See table 1 for definitions of other variables.
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a size control in columns 3 and 4 instead of the level of market 
capitalization as in columns 1 and 2. 
The results in column 3 show that the sign of the coefficient on 
Concen_Top5 flips and becomes less significant when the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization is used as a size control. Tih, 
however, continues to be positive and significant. When Tih is 
replaced with Short and Long in column 4, the coefficient on Concen_
Top5 is not statistically significant. Short continues to be positively 
related to the sensitivity of option grants to stock price (p < 0.01, 
two-tailed) but Long is not significantly related to option sensitivity 
any longer, suggesting that the positive coefficient on Tih in column 
3 appears to be driven by Short. These results are consistent with 
Smith and Swan (2007) documenting that Hartzell and Starks’ 
results are sensitive to the measurement of market capitalization as 
a control variable. Collectively, the results support that short-term 
institutions influence the board so that CEO compensation contract 
puts more weights on short-term performance through granting 
options that are more sensitive to stock price.
Influence of Institutional Investment Horizons on Pay-for-Performance 
Sensitivity of CEO Equity Portfolio Incentives
To test my prediction, I estimate the following regression equation, 
extending Core and Guay (1999).
Equity_incen i,t =  β + β1Concen_Top5i,t + β2Inst_Hori,t + β3Sizei,t + β4Btmi,t 
+ β5Fcfi,t + β6ln(Idiosyn)i,t + β7Tenurei,t + β8ln(Bd_size)i,t 
















 + ε i,t (4)
                        (t = 1998-2002) 
Where: Inst_Hor represents Short and Long.
See table 1 for variable measurement. Unlike Option_PPS, which 
only considers the sensitivity of new option grants to stock price, 
Equity_incen captures the pay-for-performance sensitivity from 
CEO equity portfolio incentives. A negative association between 
the holdings by long-term institutions and the level of total 
CEO portfolio of equity (Equity_incen) will be consistent with my 
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prediction.14) 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for equation 4. In relation 
to measurement of CEO portfolio incentive, column 1 reports the 
results when Core and Guay (1999)’s a percentage-change measure 
is used, whereas column 2 reports the results when Jensen and 
Murphy (1990)’s dollar-change measure is used. Consistent with 
prior research, CEO equity incentives are positively correlated with 
noisier operating environment and with tenure, but negatively 
correlated with book-to-market ratio (Core and Guay, 1999). As Core 
and Guay (1999) demonstrate, firm size is positively correlated with 
a percentage change incentive measure but negatively correlated 
with a dollar-change incentive measure.
Consistent with my prediction, column 1 indicates that the 
percentage holdings by long-term investors (Long) are significantly 
negatively correlated with the pay-for-performance sensitivity from 
CEO equity portfolio (t-statistic = -4.76, two-tailed). As expected, the 
percentage holdings by short-term investors (Short) are not related 
to the pay-for-performance sensitivity from CEO equity portfolio 
(t-statistic = 0.93, two-tailed). Using an alternative measure of CEO 
equity incentive does not alter the results as seen in column 2. Long 
continues to be significantly negative (t-statistic = -4.56, two-tailed) 
and Short continues to be insignificant (t-statistic = 0.42, two-tailed). 
These findings, combined with the results in the previous 
section, suggest that short-term institutions can create incentives 
for the board to structure CEO pay mix toward stock options with 
higher sensitivity to stock price but that short-term investment 
horizons create little incentive to influence the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock price. Taken together, the results suggest that 
long-term institutions make direct monitoring of effort more cost-
effective than employing compensation contracts that impose 
greater risk on CEOs—a risk that, in turn, leads to higher executive 
compensation.15)
14) I provide no prediction for the association between the holdings by short-term 
institutions and Equity_incen because short-term institutions have little incentive 
to affect CEO portfolio incentives.
15) This result stands in contrast to prior research suggesting a complementary re-
lation between concentrated institutional monitoring and the degree of pay-for-
performance documented by prior research (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Alma-
zan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005). As discussed in this section, a complementary 
relation between monitoring and incentives documented by Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) disappears once a proper size 
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Table 5. Influence of Institutional Investment Horizons on CEO Equity 
Portfolio Incentives
Equity_incen i,t =  β + β1Concen_Top5i,t + β2Inst_Hori,t + β3Sizei,t + β4Btmi,t + β5Fcfi,t  
+ β6ln(Idiosyn)i,t + β7Tenurei,t + β8ln(Bd_size)i,t + β9ln(Num_mtg)i,t  





















Core and Guay (1999) 
incentive measure
Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
incentive measure
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
Constant 3.547 *** 8.191 ***
(6.89) (15.43)
Concen_Top5 ? 0.411 0.519 *
(1.44) (1.74)
Short ? 0.196 0.180
(0.93) (0.42)
Long − -1.058 *** -1.094 ***
(-4.76) (-4.56)
Size + 0.699 *** -0.291 ***
(26.80) (-9.87)
Btm − -0.443 *** -0.480 ***
(-5.84) (-5.73)
Fcf − 0.019 0.012
(0.18) (0.11)
Idiosyn + 0.244 *** 0.275 ***
(2.71) (2.92)
Tenure + 0.063 *** 0.063 ***
(14.69) (13.45)
Bd_size ? -0.585 *** -0.585 ***
(-4.59) (-4.26)
Num_mtg ? -0.220 *** -0.240 ***
(-2.76) (-2.79)
Dual ? 0.218 *** 0.234 ***
(4.34) (4.43)
Comp_ind ? -0.304 ** -0.277 *
(-2.18) (-1.87)
N 4031 4031
Adjusted R-squared 63.3% 43.4%
*, **, and ***: Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
For parsimony, the coefficients on year-dummies and industry dummies are 
not reported. See table 1 for variable definitions.
OLS standard errors are based on Rogers (1993) serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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Effect of Institutional Investment Horizons on the Adverse Effect of Negative 
Earnings Surprise on CEO Annual Bonus
To test my prediction, I estimate the following regression 
equations, building on Matsunaga and Park (2001).
ΔBonusi,t =  β + β1Shorti,t + β2Longi,t + β3Negfe1i,t + β4Negfe2i,t 
+ β5Negfe3i,t + β6Negfe4i,t + β7Shorti,t*Negfe1i,t + 
β8Shori,t*Negfe2i,t + β9Shorti,t*Negfe3i,t + β10Shorti,t*Negfe4i,t  
+ β11Longi,t*Negfe1i,t + β12Longi,t*Negfe2i,t  
+ β13Longi,t*Negfe3i,t + β14Longi,t*Negfe4i,t + β15ΔEarni,t  
+ β16Reti,t + εi,t                (5)
ΔBonusi,t =  β + β1Shorti,t + β2Longi,t + β3Decrease1i,t + β4Decrease2i,t  
+ β5Decrease3i,t + β6Decrease4i,t + β7Shorti,t*Decrease1i,t 
+ β8Shorti,t*Decrease2i,t + β9Shorti,t*Decrease3i,t  
+ β10Shorti,t*Decrease4i,t + β11Longi,t*Decrease1i,t  
+ β12Longi,t*Decrease2i,t + β13Longi,t*Decrease3i,t  
+ β14Longi,t*Decrease4i,t + β15ΔEarni,t + β16Reti,t + εi,t (6)
See table 1 for other variable measurements. Following Matsunaga 
and Park (2001), I control for the general pay-performance relation 
by including both accounting performance and market performance 
(Lambert and Lacker 1987; Sloan 1993) and use separate indicator 
variables for the year’s number of quarters that the firm missed the 
earnings benchmark. 
I predict that the adverse effect that a firm’s missing an earnings 
benchmark has on the firm’s CEO compensation will be positively 
associated with the percentage of shares held by short-term 
institutional investors. Therefore, I expect the coefficients on the 
interaction terms between the holdings by institutions with a short 
horizon and the indicator variables corresponding to the number 
of quarterly negative earnings surprises (β7, β8, β9, and β10 in 
equations (5) and (6)) to be significantly negative. However, I expect 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between the long-term 
holdings and the indicator variables corresponding to the number of 
quarterly negative earnings surprises to be insignificant. 
control and a more comprehensive incentive measure are introduced.
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Table 6 reports how institutional investment horizons influence 
the CEO’s bonus after a firm misses an earnings benchmark. 
Column 1 reports the results when a consensus analyst earnings 
forecast is used as an earnings benchmark, whereas column 2 
reports the results when earning for the same quarter of the prior 
year is used as an earnings benchmark.16) 
The coefficients on the interaction term between each dummy 
variable capturing the number of quarters of reporting negative 
earnings surprise and the percentage of institutional holdings 
held by short-term institutions (Short) enable me to examine the 
effect that investment horizon heterogeneity has on CEO bonus 
penalties. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that with the exception of 
the coefficients on Short*Decrease1, Short*Decrease2, all the 
coefficients on Short*Negfe and Short*Decrease are significantly 
negative (p < 0.05 or less, two-tailed). Consistent with my prediction, 
the boards belonging to firms with a higher percentage of short-
term institutional ownership are more concerned about a negative 
earnings surprise and punish their CEOs more severely. 
In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction term between 
the number of quarters of reporting negative earnings surprise 
and long-term institutional ownership (Long) are not statistically 
significant except for the negative coefficients on Long*Negfe4 and 
Long*Decrease4. Note that these findings hold whether consensus 
analyst forecast or earning for the same quarter of the prior year is 
used as an earnings benchmark.17) 
Combined, the results provide strong support for the contention 
that investment behavior of institutions plays an important role in 
influencing a board’s perception of the costs of missing an earnings 
benchmark. My findings also lend support to Matsumoto’s (2002) 
contention that higher short-term institutional ownership provides 
managers with strong  incentives to meet or exceed earnings 
benchmarks, in part, because CEOs in firms with higher short-
term ownership face reduced annual bonuses if the firms miss a 
quarterly earnings benchmark.
16) Another earnings benchmark that could be considered is zero earnings. Matsu-
naga and Park (2001), however, do not find evidence that CEOs are penalized 
when they report negative quarterly earnings.  
17) To arrive at an alternative measure, I measure the dependent variable that fea-
tures a change in the natural log of CEO salary plus bonus (Lambert and Larck-
er, 1987; Sloan, 1993) and repeat the analyses. The results are similar.
Institutional Investment Horizons and CEO Compensation 125
Table 6. Influence of Institutional Investment Horizons on the Adverse 
Effect of Negative Earnings Surprise on CEO Annual Bonus
ΔBonusi,t =  β + β1Shorti,t + β2Longi,t + β3Negfe1i,t + β4Negfe2i,t + β5Negfe3i,t  
+ β6Negfe4i,t+β7Shorti,t*Negfe1i,t+β8Shori,t*Negfe2i,t  +β9Shorti,t*Negfe3i,t 
+ β10Shorti,t*Negfe4i,t + β11Longi,t*Negfe1i,t + β12Longi,t*Negfe2i,t  
+ β13Longi,t*Negfe3i,t + β14Longi,t*Negfe4i,t + β15ΔEarni,t + β16Reti,t + εi,t            
ΔBonus i,t =  β + β1Shorti,t + β2Longi,t + β3Decrease1i,t + β4Decrease2i,t + β5Decrease3i,t 
+ β6Decrease4i,t + β7Shorti,t*Decrease1i,t + β8Shorti,t*Decrease2i,t  
+ β9Shorti,t*Decrease3i,t + β10Shorti,t*Decrease4i,t + β11Longi,t*Decrease1i,t 
+ β12Longi,t*Decrease2i,t + β13Longi,t*Decrease3i,t +β14Longi,t*Decrease4i,t 
+ β15ΔEarni,t + β16Reti,t + εi,t
                 (t=1993-2002)
Variable Predicted Sign
Earnings Benchmark
Analyst Forecast Prior Year
(1) (2)
Coefficient (t-statistic)
Constant ? 0.096 * 0.079 *
(1.92) (1.87)
Short ? 0.137 0.337 ***
(1.41) (3.73)




Negfe2 − -0.134 *
(-1.76)
Negfe3 − -0.164 *
(-1.83)
Negfe4 − -0.006
   (-0.05)
Decrease1 − -0.136 *
(-1.82)






Short*Negfe1 − -0.459 ***
(-3.04)
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Table 6. (Continued)
Variable Predicted Sign
































∆ Earn + 1.980*** 1.611***
(18.25) (14.13)
Ret + 0.226*** 0.194***
(13.50) (11.48)
N 9433 9433
Adjusted R-squared 11.1% 12.4%
See table 1 for variable definitions.  *, **, and ***:  Significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
OLS standard errors are based on Rogers (1993) serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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Robustness Checks
Case of ‘Star’ CEOs. 
There has been an unprecedented quest for superstar CEOs in 
the managerial-labor market (Murphy and Zabojnik1 2003). To 
the extent that superstar CEOs are in higher demand in the labor 
market, firms will have less negotiating power to structure CEO 
compensation according to investors’ preferences. In contrast, 
theory predicts that the structure of optimal contracting does not 
vary with the relative bargaining powers of the related parties (Bolton, 
Scheinkman, and Xiong 2005). 
Using CEO press-citation data (e.g., number of major US news 
articles containing a CEO’s name) from Rajgopal, Shevlin, and 
Zamora (2006),18) I created a sub-sample of firms whose CEOs fall 
into the top quartile in terms of “visibility” in the financial press as 
a proxy for CEO talent. I repeat all previous analyses for this sub-
sample. Consistent with theoretical studies in optimal contracting, 
all of the previous findings are unchanged.
Alternative Measure of Investment Horizons. 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) propose a measure of investor 
turnover, the measure of how frequently each institution rotates 
its position on all the stocks of its portfolio (churn rate) to capture 
the length of investment horizons (see Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 
2005 for a detailed calculation of their investor-turnover measure). 
Because institutional investment horizons are naturally hard to 
observe, I repeat all previous analyses by using an investor-turnover 
measure that derives from Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) in 
place of Short and Long.19) All of the previous findings are unchanged 
and robust to an alternative measure of institutional investment 
horizons.
18) Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) use the number of articles containing a 
CEO’s name that appear in the major US and global business newspapers as a 
proxy for CEO talent for S&P 500 firms from 1993 to 2001.
19) As expected, an investor-turnover measure is positively correlated with the per-
centage holdings by short-term institutions (the correlation is 0.42) and nega-
tively correlated with the percentage holdings by long-term institutions (the cor-
relation is -0.21).
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Controlling for Legal Form of Institutions. 
Prior research suggests that the extent to which institutions 
are willing to monitor managers is different across legal form 
of institutions (Almazan, Hartzel, and Starks 2005; Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith 1988). Thus, I repeat all previous analyses after 
additionally controlling for the percentage holdings by banks, 
insurance companies, investment advisors, and pension and 
endowment. All of the previous findings are unchanged and robust 
to adding legal form of institutions as a control.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine whether the investment horizons of a 
firm’s institutional investors are associated with the structure of 
CEO compensation. I argue and predict that the investment horizon 
of institutional investors can both directly and indirectly influence 
executive compensation. 
I find that short-term institutions could encourage the board of 
directors to structure executive compensation practices on the basis 
of short-term investors’ preferences (e.g., more stock options that 
do not need to be expensed, higher option sensitivity to stock price, 
and larger annual bonus penalties for missing quarterly earnings 
benchmarks). Short-term institutions, however, do not appear to 
influence CEO equity holdings incentives. On the other hand, and 
in line with an optimal contracting view of CEO compensation, I 
find that long-term institutional monitoring is likely a substitute for 
managerial incentives. 
Overall, the analyses provide evidence consistent with the 
influence that shareholder investment horizons have on the 
structure of CEO compensation. By explicitly relating institutional 
investment horizons to executive compensation, my study adds 
to the growing literature that links managerial compensation to 
shareholder investor horizons (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong 
2005, 2006; Dikolli, Kulp, and Sedatole 2006) and to the literature 
on the governance role of institutional trading (Gopalan 2005). This 
study should be of interest to regulators, investors, and boards of 
directors, all of which may need to manage a firm’s investor base 
and to mitigate undue influences from investor clientele.  
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APPENDIX
Estimation of Simultaneous Equations
Given the potential for endogeneity between firms’ use of stock 
options and institutional holdings by investment horizons, I estimate 
the following system of two equations in an effort to understand the 
nature of the observed relation: 
%Equity_grant i,t =  β + β1Inst_Hori,t + β2Noise_roai,t + β3Noise_reti,t  
+ β4High_taxi,t + β5Low_taxi,t + β6Levi,t + β7Btmi,t  
+ β8Ownershipi,t + β9Sizei,t + β10Newi,t + β11Fcfi,t  
+ β12Bd_sizei,t + β13Num_mtgi,t + β14Duali,t  
















 + υ1,t  
        
                             (t = 1998-2002)
Inst_Hor i,t =  β + β1%Equity_granti,t + β2SP500i,t + β3Btmi,t + β4Sizei,t  
+ β5Betai,t + β6Idiosyni,t + β7Levi,t + β8Lossi,t +β9SPratingi,t 
+ β10M-reti,t + β11Dpi,t + β12Epi,t + β13Cfoi,t + β14Liqi,t  
 














 + υ2,t               
                   (t = 1998-2002)
SP500 = 1 if the firm is part of the S&P 500, and 0 otherwise
Beta =  the market model beta, estimated over a maximum 60 and 
minimum of 12 months 
Idiosyn =  unsystematic risk, defined as the standard deviation of 
daily market model residuals over the prior year
Loss = 1 if the firm reports a net loss, and 0 otherwise
SPrating = S&P common stock rating
M_ret = the market adjusted return 
Dp = dividend-to-price ratio
Ep = earnings-price-ratio
Cfo = cash flow from operations 
Liq =  average monthly trading volume divided by shares 
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outstanding over the year
Sgr = sales growth relative to previous year
I first regress each endogenous variable on all exogenous 
variables. In the second stage, equations (8) and (9) are separately 
estimated with the right-side endogenous variable replaced by its 
fitted value from the first stage regression. 
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